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The countries all over the world agree that something needs to be done about global 
warming and climate change. In 1988, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) was created by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the 
World Meterological Organization (WMO) to assess the scientific knowledge on glo-
bal warming. The IPCC concluded in 1990 that there was broad international consen-
sus that climate change was human-induced. That report led way to an international 
convention for climate change, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), signed by over 150 countries at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. The 
Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement linked to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, which commits its Parties by setting internationally 
binding emission reduction targets. 
Recognising that developed countries are principally responsible for the current 
high levels of GHG emissions in the atmosphere as a result of more than 150 years of 
industrial activity, the Protocol places a heavier burden on developed nations under 
the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. The Kyoto Protocol was 
adopted in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 1997 and entered into force on 16 February 
2005. The detailed rules for the implementation of the Protocol were adopted at COP 
7 in Marrakesh, Morocco, in 2001, and referred to as the “Marrakesh Accords.” Its first 
commitment period started in 2008 and ended in 2012. During the first commitment 
period, 37 industrialised countries and the European Community committed to reduce 
GHG emissions to an average of 5% against 1990 levels. During the second commitment 
period, Parties committed to reduce GHG emissions by at least 18% below 1990 levels 
in the eight-year period from 2013 to 2020; however, the composition of the Parties in 
the second commitment period is different from the first. The commitments for the next 
period are negotiated during the Conferences of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COPs). 
According to the latest Lithuanian GHG emission inventory report to UNFCCC 
in 2010, GHG emissions in Lithuania have decreased by 56,9%, compared to the 1990 
level. In 2010, GHG emissions increased by 4.3%, compared to 2009. During 2005-2010 
GHG emissions have decreased by 10.1% and GDP growth was about 27,2%, indica-
ting the decoupling of GHG emissions from economic growth. Compared to 2009, GHG 
emissions have increased in 2010 mainly in public electricity and heat production due 
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to growing gas-based thermal power production. After the closure of Ignalina nuclear 
power plant in 2009, thermal power production based on natural gas is the most im-
portant source of electricity production in Lithuania. In addition, emissions from hou-
seholds and services increased due to colder winter months, compared to 2009. Finally, 
emissions from road transport and industry increased, reflecting the gradual economic 
recovery after strong decline in 2009. Average 2008–2011 emissions in Lithuania were 
56.2 % lower than the base-year level, well below the Kyoto target of -8 % for the period 
of 2008–2012. In the sectors not covered by the EU ETS, emissions were significantly 
lower than their respective target, by an amount equivalent to 44 % of base-year emis-
sions. Lithuania intends to use the flexible mechanisms at governmental level by selling 
an amount of Kyoto units equivalent to 28.6 % of base-year emissions per year. Taking 
all these effects into account, average emissions in the sectors not covered by the EU ETS 
in Lithuania were standing below their target level, by a gap representing 17.7 % of the 
base-year emissions. Lithuania was therefore on track towards its Kyoto target by the end 
of 2011. Though Lithuania does not have problems in implementing its Kyoto require-
ments, as the EU Member State it has to comply with EU commitments and follows the 
EU negotiation track with UNFCCC Secretariat for the second requirement of the Kyoto 
Protocol.  
The most recent COP18 was held in 2012. 18th session of the Conference of the 
Parties to the UNFCCC and 8th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol opened on Monday, 26 November, and 
continued until Saturday, 8 December 2012 at the Qatar National Convention Centre 
in Doha, Qatar. Some 17,000 official delegates from 194 nations attended the official 
summit at the Qatar National Convention Centre. The world’s leading scientists, at least 
1,500 journalists and thousands of NGO representatives participated in the conference. 
As this was an environmentally-friendly summit, carpooling and public transportation 
were encouraged. Some 400 busses will shuttle participants to and from the QNCC, and 
no private cars will be allowed into the Centre.
The COP18 in Doha focused on five aspects of climate change: 
•  Adaptation – social and other changes that must be undertaken to successfully 
adapt to climate change. Adaptation might encompass, but is not limited to, 
changes in agriculture and urban planning.
•  Mitigation – steps and actions that the countries of the world can take to miti-
gate the effects of climate change.
•  Finance – how countries will finance adaptation to and mitigation of climate 
change, whether from public or private sources.
•  Technology – the technologies that are needed to adapt or mitigate climate 
change and ways in which developed countries can support developing coun-
tries in adopting them.
•  Loss and damage – first articulated at the 2012 conference and in part based 
on the agreement that was signed at the 2010 United Nations Climate Change 
Conference in Cancun. 
The main objective of Doha from a procedural perspective was to streamline the 
negotiating process. Therefore, countries were seeking to conclude negotiations on a sec-
ond Kyoto Protocol commitment period, terminate parallel Convention talks on how to 
enhance collective climate action by all countries, and give shape and direction to the new 
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Durban Platform process for agreeing a new global climate treaty in 2015. On all three 
counts, COP 18 delivered significant results.
Though successful in general, the COP18 did not deliver any improvement in miti-
gation ambition on the part of major emitters. Going into the conference, all the major 
parties had clearly signaled that they were unlikely to move beyond current pledges. This 
was particularly true of the US, whose position effectively set a ceiling on ambition. The 
EU might have pushed the boundaries, but internal difficulties within the group meant 
that it was never likely to move up to its higher 30% target unilaterally. With the devel-
oped world unwilling to increase their targets, there was no incentive for China or India 
to raise theirs.
In practice this means that the Kyoto Protocol – still the only legally binding, quan-
tified, international climate treaty does not provide for real results in climate change 
mitigation. The second Kyoto Protocol commitment period (2CP) will cover only 15% 
of the global emissions, with the 2020 target of the largest party (the EU) already ef-
fectively met. Collectively, the overall emission reduction will be approximately 18% by 
2020 compared to 1990 levels, significantly less than the 25-40% range recommended by 
climate scientists.
An opportunity to improve ambition by allowing access to the Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) for those countries not taking 2CP commitments (i.e. 
the US, Japan, Canada, Russia and New Zealand) was also missed during COP18. If this 
were allowed, it could have provided an additional source of demand for CDM credits by 
financing mitigation efforts in developing countries and achieving greater results in GHG 
emission reduction.
The weak decision relating to the carryover of unused emission allowance units 
from the first commitment period (estimated to be around 13 billion units) was adopted 
in COP18. Many of these are the so-called ‘hot-air’ units, coming from former Soviet-
union countries, including Lithuania. Their impact, however, will be mitigated by new 
limitations on the trading in these units and the fact that most of the 2nd commitment 
period Parties, not least the EU, have stated that they will not purchase these units. Such 
a restriction will limit their use to the original holders joining the new commitment pe-
riod, such as Poland and Ukraine. As negotiations proceed under the Durban Platform, 
the concern is that Russia (the main holder of hot air) and other countries may seek to roll 
their Kyoto surpluses into the new post-2020 climate deal. 
The other weak outcome that emerged in COP18 underlined the critical role that 
progressive business and sub-national government leaders would need to play if global 
efforts to address climate change were to be raised over the coming three to five ye-
ars. On the positive side, the package of decisions, dubbed the ‘Doha Climate Gateway’, 
keep climate negotiations on track towards the new global climate deal in 2015. But the 
continuing lack of mitigation ambition from major emitters means that the window of 
opportunity for keeping global warming below 2oC is closing rapidly. Despite all of these 
weaknesses, the COP18 did not close the door on greater climate action. 
Attempts to strengthen carbon accounting rules for monitoring, reporting and ve-
rification (MRV) were also unsuccessful. This will make it difficult to assess the compara-
bility of mitigation effort, particularly between those developed countries taking action 
under Kyoto and those who have made pledges under the Convention.
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The previous COP17 in Durban saw some diplomatic success for the EU. The 
agreed so-called ‘Durban Package’ was more or less the minimum deal that Europe had 
sought going into the meeting. In Doha, the EU aimed to wrap up the outstanding issues 
contained in the Durban Package, and consolidate and simplify the ongoing negotiating 
process. Like of many other countries, Europe’s three basic objectives are to: adopt an 
amendment to the Kyoto Protocol that will implement a second commitment period 
from 1 January 2013; conclude the parallel Convention track negotiations on ‘Long-Term 
Cooperative Action’ and to start work on a new post-2020 global treaty and the means 
for raising ambition in the interim period, under the new Durban Platform process.
To achieve these goals, the EU will require a number of conditions to be met. For 
example, political support in Europe for a second Kyoto commitment period will require, 
in part, comparable commitments on emission reductions from the other major emitters. 
While the EU recognises that neither the US nor China will make Kyoto-style commi-
tments in Doha, it will need to see some form of increased action on mitigation from the 
world’s largest emitters as a sign of good faith. The EU was seeking greater ambition on 
the monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) framework for mitigation action, so 
that all major emitters use comparable systems. A deal to restrict the carry-over of unu-
sed emission allowances from the first Kyoto commitment period in order to protect and 
raise the environmental integrity of actions beyond 2012 will also be critical to the EU.
As with any negotiation, the EU will need to give and receive if it wants the outco-
me it is seeking. Increasing its 2020 emission reduction target from 20% to 30% is the 
obvious card it has to play. Recent analysis conducted by EC concluded that the EU had 
already achieved its 20% reductions. Adopting the 30% target would make an important 
political statement in Doha, but could also be wasted, if unreciprocated by the likes of 
the US and China. 
According to the Copenhagen Accord, a financing gap has opened up between the 
needs of developing countries and the availability of funds. The EU has so far given out 
€7.1 billion to finance climate mitigation and adaptation efforts in the least advanced 
countries and has nearly met its pledge to deliver €7.2 billion. But a more substantive 
gesture on climate finance is a key lever that the EU will need to consider. However, 
the economic crisis, the euro-crisis and weak economic growth mean there is far less 
political support in Europe for new public funding commitments, to make sure climate 
financing will continue to increase for poor countries after 2012. To sum up, the COP18 
has the potential to advance the EU’s climate action goals, but success – as always – will 
depend on a combination of EU leadership and reciprocated action from key partners.
Regarding mitigation, one of the most positive sides of COP18 was the fact that 
countries did manage to conclude negotiations on a new commitment period under the 
Kyoto Protocol, as well as wrap up parallel talks on how to enhance collective clima-
te action by all countries. This has left countries with a much streamlined, single track 
negotiation process from next year, focused on the Durban Platform process, which is 
meant to agree a new global climate treaty by 2015. Countries, however, failed to move 
beyond the emission reduction pledges that have been on the table since the Copenhagen 
conference in 2009. The net result is that Doha leaves the world firmly on track to 4 de-
grees or more of warming by 2100.
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Some important issues were simply ignored during COP18. For example, emissions 
from international aviation and maritime transport were a case in point. Although inclu-
ded in the earlier draft decisions, in the end the countries could not reach an agreement 
on how to deal with these sectors.
Regarding adaptation, the principle outcome on adaptation at COP18 was un-
doubtedly the decision to establish ‘institutional arrangements’ for some kind of ‘Loss 
and Damage’ mechanism at next year’s COP. This is a major achievement for develo-
ping countries, particularly those most vulnerable to extreme and long-term impacts 
of climate change, such as small island states. These countries have been calling for such 
an instrument for many years. However, negotiations on this issue over the coming 12 
months are unlikely to be any easier than they were in Doha. Developed countries, espe-
cially the US, wary about any arrangements that may institutionalise historic responsibi-
lity or legal liability for future climate impacts. A key question to be answered is how this 
mechanism will actually be funded. Given the low level of funds provided by developed 
countries for the Green Climate Fund, new financing sources could well be critical to the 
operation of the new Loss and Damage mechanism. 
Regarding finance, this issue has been proved to be the most difficult one to resolve 
in Doha. No quantified, collective commitment was made, although a number of coun-
tries, i.e. UK, Germany, Sweden and France did come forward with individual pledges. 
A work programme on long-term finance was extended for a year to help advance on-
going discussions. Requests were also made to the financial institutions set up in recent 
years under the UNFCCC. The overall outcome on finance was disappointing for many 
developing countries. One reason for this is that hard-line position taken by developed 
countries in Doha underlined the very real political limits on public funding from these 
parties. The euro crisis, earthquake costs and slow economic growth have hit budgets of 
all the major donors hard, making climate aid a difficult sell to domestic audiences. 
Regarding technology transfer, the intellectual property rights are crucial. The issue 
of intellectual property rights (IPR) was once again the main point of contention in Doha 
on technology. As with COP17, the issue did not make it into a final decision, it remained 
one of the principal redline issues for developed countries. Beyond the clash over IPR, the 
main focus of technology negotiations in Doha was providing further instructions to the 
two bodies that make up the Technology Mechanism established in Cancun in 2010. The 
Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre & Network 
(CTCN) are intended to improve low carbon technology transfer to developing countries. 
The TEC provides broad policy advice while the CTCN focuses on implementation. 
On the positive side in Doha, the agreement to further develop a new market me-
chanism and a framework for voluntary approaches underlined that countries – both de-
veloped and developing – recognise the value of these tools. Work programmes for both 
schemes have been established for 2013 ‘with a view’ to making decisions at next year’s 
COP that elaborate how the mechanism and framework will operate. The sharp drop 
has been driven by EU restrictions on the use of CDM carbon offset credits and general 
oversupply of carbon allowances in Europe’s emissions trading scheme.
The failure to extend access to the CDM to Parties not participating in Kyoto’s 2nd 
commitment periods – a key recommendation of a high level expert panel earlier this 
year – is also damaging. Since its establishment, the mechanism has driven $215 billion 
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in investment in developing countries, saved developed countries $3.6 billion in mitiga-
tion costs and avoided 1 gigaton of emissions. Without the demand for offset credits that 
these non-2CP countries could have bought to the market, the CDM is likely to wither. 
Given the knowledge, skills and infrastructure built up over the last ten years around the 
CDM – in both developed and developing countries – this outcome is a tragedy.
It is also important to bear in mind that with the conclusion of both the Protocol 
and Convention track negotiations, there are now a number of new bodies and work 
programmes focused on implementing the agreed decisions. This means that practical 
work is underway on climate finance, technology transfer and adaptation, to name three 
key areas. In the short to medium term, these efforts are likely to be just as important in 
building momentum and ambition as the ongoing Durban Platform negotiations. Their 
success will depend on the effort and commitment put into them by parties.
By demonstrating that low carbon investment and policies are good for the bottom 
line and local communities, corporate, state and regional leaders can create domestic 
support for ambitious climate action that national governments need, to take real action 
internationally. 
Conclusions
1.  The COP18 in Doha has produced a package of documents collectively enti-
tled The Doha Climate Gateway over objections from Russia and other coun-
tries at the session.
2.  The documents collectively contained: An eight year extension of the Kyoto 
Protocol until 2020 limited in scope to only 15% of the global carbon dioxide 
emissions due to the lack of participation of Canada, Japan, Russia, Belarus, 
Ukraine, New Zealand and the United States and due to the fact that develo-
ping countries like China (the world’s largest emitter), India and Brazil are not 
subject to any emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol.
3.  The conference reached an agreement to extend the life of the Kyoto Protocol, 
which had been due to expire at the end of 2012, until 2020, and to reify the 
2011 Durban Platform, meaning that a successor to the Protocol is set to be 
developed by 2015 and implemented by 2020. 
4.  The wording adopted by the conference incorporated for the first time the con-
cept of ‘loss and damage’, an agreement in principle that richer nations could 
be financially responsible to other nations for their failure to reduce carbon 
emission.
5.  However, the second commitment period covering only 15% of global emis-
sions and with the provisions to allow carry-over of significant amounts of 
unused carbon credits, the new commitment period will have little impact on 
the growth of global emissions and the conference made little progress towards 
the funding of the Green Climate Fund.
6.  Though Lithuanian does not have problems in implementing its Kyoto re-
quirements, as the EU Member State it has to comply with the EU commit-
ments and it follows the EU negotiation track with UNFCCC Secretariat for 
the second Kyoto protocol requirement.  
